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Abstract
For more than 30 years Indonesians were ruled under “Demokrasi Pancasila” favored by the
Suharto administration.  In-spite of the fact that Indonesia enjoyed economic stability, freedom of
expression voicing an opinion not to the administration’s best interest was not tolerated.  The nation
knew only general elections where participating politicians were nominated by one of the three
political parties.  Public executives were appointed by the ruling party.  Demonstrations were repressed
through various security regulations, if not by means of force.  Being part of Angkatan Bersenjata
Republik Indonesia (ABRI, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), the police depended
heavily on the military’s support in restoring public security.  One-way communication was the order
of the day.  It was an easy life indeed for the public sector. Obviously, the monetary crisis which hit
the country in mid 1997 brought revolutionary changes into the life of Indonesians too hard for the
public sector to believe, never mind to accept. All of the sudden they saw political reform that
introduced real democracy.  The implementation of regional decentralization brought a lot of confusion
and frustration.  As public security became the sole responsibility of the police, the military’s duty
should be handling defense matters and providing assistance in emergency situations only.  Presidential
election was held directly.  Everything is subject to mass protest and  demonstration staged throughout
the country. Suddenly, the public sector had to adopt new values.  They were simply not prepared
for the new realities. Wanting to do things the easy way, top managements of the public sector
realized that it needed to address the new challenge accordingly.  Thus, empowering the internal
stakeholders became their priority before communicating with any external stakeholder.  How?
Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), Kabupaten Kebumen (a level II Administration) in Central
Java, and Garuda (a State-owned airline) had their experiences for us to share.
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Introduction
Indonesia’s present problems are a result
of the economic crisis that hit Asia in mid 1997
when, one by one, Thailand, Indonesia, and
South Korea fell victim to that crisis and came to
face serious economic problems and
uncertainties. Unlike the other two, Indonesia is
yet to recover --despite the best intentions and
efforts of concerned fellow Indonesians, global
financial institutions, and international aid
agencies.  It hasn’t been for want of trying but it
should be recognized that the economic crisis also
triggered political and other problems, which, in
turn, touched off major changes unprecedented
in Indonesia’s history.
For more than 30 years Indonesians were ruled
under “Demokrasi Pancasila” favored by the
Soeharto  administration, more popularly known
as the Orde Baru (New Order) era.  In-spite of
the fact that Indonesia enjoyed economic
stability,  freedom   of    expression   voicing   an
opinion  not   to   the government’s best interest
was not tolerated.  The nation knew only general
elections  where  participating  politicians  were
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nominated  by three political parties.  Public
executives were appointed by Golongan Karya
(Golkar, Functional Group) the ruling party.
Demonstrations were repressed through various
security regulations, if not by means of force.
Being part of Angkatan Bersenjata Republik
Indonesia (ABRI, Armed Forces of the Republic
of Indonesia), the police depended heavily on
the military’s support in restoring public security.
One-way communication was the order of the
day.  It was an easy life indeed for the public
sector.
What were the new realities brought by
reformasi into the public sector?  Demand for
transparency. Increasing public awareness about
democracy, law, and human rights.  The
elimination of korupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme
(KKN, corruption, collusion and nepotism) that
had been voiced a few weeks prior to Soeharto’s
downfall will continue.
New Challenges
Obviously, the monetary crisis brought
revolutionary changes into the life of Indonesians
which were too hard for the public sector to
believe.  Never mind to accept. All of the sudden
we saw a political reform that introduced real
democracy.  The implementation of regional
decentralization brought a lot of confusion and
frustration.  As public security became the sole
responsibility of the police, the military’s duty
should be handling defense matters and providing
assistance in emergency situations only.  Suddenly,
the public sector had to adopt new values.  They
were simply not prepared for the new realities.
Yet, the show must go on.  The public sector’s
top management was making sure that their
internal stakeholders would be empowered with
new strategies, namely new skills and new tools.
For the purpose of our discussion, I wish
to quote the thoughts of our gurus in their well-
known textbook “Effective Public Relations.”
Quote.  “Internal relations deal with publics
concerned about or involved in the workings of
the organization, such as employees, families of
employees, and volunteers.  An organization’s
most important relationships are those with
employees at all levels.  The term internal public
represents the organization’s greatest resource,
its people.  Two factors are changing employee
communication and enhancing management’s
respect for this part of the public relations task:
1) the value of understanding, teamwork, and
commitment by employees in achieving bottom-
line results, and 2) the need to build a strong
manager-communications network, one that
makes every supervisor at all level accountable
for communicating effectively with his or her
employees.”  End quote. In today’s word it is
the relations with internal stakeholders, the most
neglected stakeholders in our day-to-day work.
In my opinion, basic values of the organization,
including credos, mission statements, vision
statements, and statements of purpose; have to
be shared with all internal stakeholders.
What were the Indonesian experiences
for us to share?  Since the monetary crisis, no
political institution in Indonesia has suffered a
greater crisis of legitimacy than the military.
Theorists argue that civil-military reform is a
critical component of democratization. Yet, many
Indonesians credit the military with a role in the
founding of the Republic and therefore tolerate
its often-violent approach to quelling conflict in
daerah rawan (trouble area).  Demands for
military reform, such as dismantling territorial
command structure, accepting civilian control,
and introducing transparency into its budget
process will become routine.
The military will have to return to its
principal role as the nation’s defense force, and
should cease to be the tool of any political party
as it was before reformasi when it sided with
Golkar in the contest for political power. It will
never again meddle in the affairs of the civilian
government nor be involved in issues that are not
related to national defense.  Critics also argued
that the dwi-fungsi (dual function) doctrine had
become the military justification for involving itself
in every aspect of running the country: politics,
social control, economics, and security, both
internal and external.  An opinion leader
commented, “Unlike in most countries, the
Indonesian military, with its peculiar dwi-fungsi
(holding both the sword and the plowshare)
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evolved from being the savior to becoming the
scourge of the nation.”
On top of that, it has been predicted that
the public will show more courage to criticize
and even condemn the military for repressive
measures it took against civilians, especially which
occurred during the Orde Baru era.  It will be
condemned and there will be calls to account for
these excesses.   There will be also a demand
for the dissolution of the territorial military
commands known as   Komando Distrik Militer
(Kodim) and Komando Rayon Militer
(Koramil) as they were deemed not in tune with
reformasi.
On the other hand, the military readily
accepted to end the kekaryaan (secondment),
a system that placed military officers in civil post;
in fact, many within the armed forces, were
convinced that this is in the interest of improving
professionalism within the Civil Service.  Another
early step taken by the military on its own initiative
was to cut formal ties with Golkar and adopt a
strictly neutral position in elections.
These new challenges required
empowering the internal stakeholders, rather than
permitting them to revert to their former
authoritarian practices.   The military undertook
several reforms in response to all criticism.  In
April 1999, it announced “Paradigma Baru
TNI,” the new paradigm and a step to signal
reform by changing its name from Angkatan
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI) back
to their original name since the Independence
War: Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).  This
name was a source of pride and in a sense
reclaimed past glory.  Two months earlier, “Law
on the Composition of Legislatures” reduced the
seats reserved for the military at all levels by 50
percent in the bodies to be formed by the 1999
elections.
Meanwhile there was a continuing
seesawing of policy on the military’s withdrawal
from formal politics.  In a surprise move, Majelis
Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, the People’s
Consultative Assembly) in 2000 extended the
time frame for reserved seats for both the TNI
and Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia
(Polri) in the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR)
until 2004, and in the MPR until 2009.  But in
August 2002, the MPR voted to eliminate
reserved seats for the military in all legislative
bodies permanently commencing with the 2004
elections.
It has been predicted that civil-military
reforms will call also for 1) converting all TNI-
owned enterprises into state-owned, 2) having
all of them audited by independent auditors, 3)
strengthening the political party system and civilian
political institutions, 4) reviewing and revamping
all legislations “condoning half hearted civilian
control over the TNI,” and 5) revising the
security doctrine that governs the TNI.
In response to the new realities, a series
of nationwide sessions, and various orientation
programs were (and are still) held to assure that
everyone within the TNI understand and uphold
the Paradigma Baru TNI.  All professional
trainings were not exempted.  In short, the internal
stakeholders had to be continuously reminded
that the TNI has to ‘retreat to the barracks’, and
abandon its dwi-fungsi doctrine which
guaranteed it a paramount role in politics.
A Learning from Kebumen
How did a tiny Kabupaten Kebumen
(a level II Administration) coped with the
reformasi realities?  A young DPR member, won
the local election and became Indonesia’s first
woman Bupati.  When she took office,
Kabupaten Kebumen ranked third (from the
bottom!) out of the 23 level II Administrations in
Central Java.  In the reformasi era most
Administration Heads in Indonesia are non-
bureaucrats without public administration
background.  Unlike her predecessors, she had
a university degree in public administration. She
discovered that during the Orde Baru era so-
called journalists were active in all regions
terrorizing Government executives, especially the
Kepala Desa (Village Head).  Negative articles
could be avoided through lucrative payments.
This was an important factor not to be tolerated.
Government executives were then not authorized
to give press statements and were never taught
to communicate effectively with stakeholders.
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For the Civil Administration, the new
reality was the demand to implement “Good
Governance,” a strange word that in a way is its
“10 commandments.” It calls for transparency,
supervision, effective and efficient, responsive,
public participation, strategic vision, law
enforcement, accountability, equality, and
professionalism.  Furthermore, the enactment of
Law No 22/1999 on “Regional Governments”
and Law No. 25/1999 on “Revenue Sharing
between the Central and Regional
Governments”, will require Kebumen
Government to ensure that its Civil Service is free
from KKN.  With the locus of power turned into
the hands of the legislators, the Kebumen
Legislature will play a more effective role in law
making.
In such setting, communication and trust-
building skills are highly important for the internal
stakeholders to assure an effective
communication with the external stakeholders.
Government programs and policies have to be
understood to receive public support.  Aside from
initiating face-to-face communication, the
government’s media   should   be   upgraded
and new   ones   should   be   built, as they are
vital communication tools.  A “Balai Warta
(News Center) will be built for journalists to meet
with Government executives for first-hand
information, ensuring public   transparency and
eliminating counter-productive rumors. For the
media to receive a balanced information,
Government executives will be required to explain
their programs openly and routinely.
Efforts to improve communication
facilities should include the upgrading of the
government’s  “Radio Indrakila” to become an
FM radio station and the founding of a community
television station “Ratih TV” to enable
government executives conduct an interactive
communication with all external stakeholders,
especially with those living in the rural areas.
Through the two broadcast media, every
workday Government executives will take turns
to interact and do their presentations.
What about individual empowerment?  A
special workshop on media relations, which
included writing new releases, and doing
presentations were conducted for all Government
executives, starting from the Kepala Desa up to
the Sekretaris Daerah (Sekda, Executive
Secretary of the Kabupaten).  Unlike previous
practice in which only top management met the
media, now they were authorized and instructed
to answer question from the media directly or
issue statements about their respective
responsibilities.
Reformasi and a Vision of the Future
How did reformasi challenged a public
enterprise?  Throughout the Orde Baru era, the
State-owned PT Garuda Indonesia had the
monopoly in long haul and domestic trunk line
services.  Thus, very little marketing efforts were
needed.  If it previously enjoyed the “seller’s
market” concept, reformasi brought new
realities.  Monopoly in airline business is gone.
Competing new airlines operated more efficiently
by adopting new technology, such as electronic
ticketing.  In fact, many were able to operate on
the “lean but mean” organizational structure by
offering personalized services and even gave
away prizes.  Garuda had no other option but to
join the “buyer’s market” concept and
aggressively market its services.
In the early days of reformasi for
instance, Garuda came up with an “On Time
Performance (OTP)” marketing slogan based on
the awards presented by Amsterdam’s Schiphol
airport.  A slogan that no other Indonesian airlines
were able to challenge.  When the advertising
campaign was about ready to be launched, it was
discovered that the OTP slogan had not been
communicated properly to the internal
stakeholders.  The campaign had to be delayed
for a few months to allow Management inform
and discuss with everyone involved in the
departure as well arrival of Garuda flights,
especially front liners, about the new slogan.  And
that everyone in Garuda should be entrepreneurs,
rather than just a Government employee. The
President Director himself took time to meet them
in each session.
Indonesia’s snail-paced recovery
program was proceeding in the face of almost
insurmountable odds: violent currency
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fluctuations; market volatility; a badly shaken
bond market; hitherto unimaginable levels of
corporate and foreign debts that caused the
assets of major corporations taken over by the
Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional
(BPPN, Bank Restructuring Agency); a
devastated banking sector; unprecedented
massive natural disasters: tsunami, earthquakes,
land erosions, floods and forest fires; outbreak
of pandemic diseases: bird flu and polio; and
national assets subject to physical threat (Exxon
in Aceh and Cepu, Newmont in North Sulawesi
and Nusa Tenggara, and Freeport in Papua).
Everything is subject to continuous mass protests
and demonstrations staged throughout the
country.
Allow me now to update you briefly
about Indonesia in its early years of democracy.
In 2004 general election was held to elect
legislators, and three months later, for the first
time ever, Indonesia directly elected a president
for a five-year term. The power to choose our
leaders is now in our hands. We had eight general
elections since 1955 but only two really count as
meeting the basic requirements for a free, fair
and democratic poll. We saw a new tradition
when presidential candidates campaigned across
the country for one month.   They explained their
platforms at length, made multiple promises and
interestingly enough, entertained the people as a
way of winning votes.
Reputation defined all election
candidates more than policy differences. All of
them had promised to reduce poverty, create jobs
and end endemic corruption, while offering scant
details of how this will be done. But they were at
least correct in identifying economic issues as the
country’s key challenge. With more than two
million young people entering the job market each
year, economists say Indonesia’s GDP must grow
by seven percent annually if those citizens are to
find work. Indonesia’s list of problems is so long
it makes one wonder why anyone would even
want to be its president.
While his Partai Demokrat
(Democratic Party) won only seven percent,
Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, popularly known
after his initials SBY (as-bay-yay), won 33
percent at the Presidential election. Wiranto who
was endorsed by the Golkar Party and Gus
Dur’s Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB,
National Awakening Party) should have won
more than 30 percent of the vote but won only
20-plus percent instead. In short, the way people
voted defied the political power distribution
reflected in the legislature elections. It shows the
Indonesian voters were rational and mature.
Today, eight years of a chaotic and
sometimes violent democratic transition following
the ouster of Soeharto in 1998, has many
Indonesians indeed longing for the good old days
of stable, authoritarian rule – minus the economic
plunder and human rights abuses. Various
surveys showed that 45 percent of the public
wanted SBY to take center stage, and the
presidential election’s first round confirmed such
demand. SBY was one of the two contenders in
the runoff election, and became Indonesia’s first
directly elected President. Indonesia can take
pride that it is contributing to making democracy
work.   It became not only the world’s third
largest democracy after the USA and India but
at the same time, a   country   with   the    largest
Moslem    population    embracing    democracy.
Change of great intensity is indeed taking
place in Indonesia at a fast and furious pace  and
as  the  nation searches  for  a new sense of
destiny and a new image, communicating this new
paradigm is in the hands of fellow public relations
practitioners. They  must  be  capable  of
transcending  the  dichotomy of reform, otherwise
they might be perceived as mere agents of a
prevailing status quo. They must proactively
search for ways to manage change; otherwise
they will lose their credibility as they try to usher
in the future. Above all, they must be able to
develop a vision of the future for themselves to
pursue and for others to appreciate.  Democracy
is in Indonesia to stay, and we certainly do not
wish to trade it for anything despite the unpleasant
teething problems.
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